Latest EO Finds Unexpected New Way To Secure And Protect National Security… Why Weren’t We Already Doing This?
The best ideas often seem like 'no brainers' -- AFTER someone comes up with them
There’s a real ‘well, duh!’ factor to a plan that should have been staring us ALL in the face with all the lessons and mistakes made during the pandemic, but for some reason, nobody went there until now.
It is building on one of the lessons learned about medical supply chains during the COVID era… and taking it miles beyond what had been done before.
We learned a thing or two about just how vulnerable supply lines can be in an era of Just-in-time production. The panic-buying of toilet paper and bulk buying (and reselling for insane markups) of hand sanitizer in the beginning was just the tip of the iceberg for a bigger problem.
We learned China had been quietly buying up and hoarding many of the safety materials that would soon be in massive demand — gloves and mask, for instance — long before the rest of the world had been alerted to the seriousness of the threat that this virus would go global and make a mess of the place.
We also came to realize that most of our pharmaceuticals were made in Asia, and if we were ever in a serious conflict with China, they would hold incredible leverage over the average American by simply threatening to cut our supply of a wide range of life-saving medications. While the scenario was usually presented in the context of a conflict in Taiwan, there is no reason Xi would not be able to leverage it to make policy choices that ran contrary to our national interest.
We will remember that early in the pandemic, before any new wonderdrug had been rushed to the market, some signs of optimism were pointing to the possible usefulness of Ivermectin and a cheap and readily available antimalarial drug whose safety record has been established through 70 years of regular use.
Trump took the unusual step of ordering a massive quantity of the antimalarial for public use on the possibility that it would prove useful in reducing the overall risk of the virus and helping America return to normal life. As we all know, anything short of the new and highly-profitable (not to mention government-mandated) wonderdrug was NOT open to meaningful consideration.
In other words, Trump was stockpiling a medication for national security reasons, hoping it would protect the lives of countless American citizens.
Another administration has come and gone since than, whose commitment to National Security has expressed itself in depleting the military, selling off the oil reserves to shave a couple of points off of inflation for the midterm elections, and employing a catch-and-release policy on the Southern Border that has released thousands of known criminals and terror watch list security threats into the general population.
Trump, who had just topped up that oil reserve when oil prices cratered during COVID, is back in office.
He has made it clear that he takes national security seriously, building on what he began back in his first term.
We include the full text of the order so our readers can see for themselves.
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
Section 1. Purpose. During my first term, my Administration acted to protect the health and security of the American people by restoring capacity for domestic production of essential pharmaceutical products. Executive Order 13944 of August 6, 2020 (Combatting Public Health Emergencies and Strengthening National Security by Ensuring Essential Medicines, Medical Countermeasures, and Critical Inputs Are Made in the United States), directed certain executive departments and agencies (agencies) to consider a variety of actions to increase their domestic procurement of Essential Medicines, Medical Countermeasures, and Critical Inputs, as defined in section 7 of that order, and to identify supply chain vulnerabilities. The Food and Drug Administration published a list of Essential Medicines, Medical Countermeasures, and Critical Inputs in October 2020. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) within the Department of Health and Human Services later reduced the list to 86 essential medicines.
Nearly two in five prescription finished drug products are made in the United States, including many of the essential medicines. However, when it comes to Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), the biologically active components of finished drug products, only about 10 percent of the APIs by volume for the finished drug products used in the United States are made here.
During my first term, my first Administration created a Strategic Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients Reserve (SAPIR) to stockpile APIs. Stockpiling APIs is advantageous as APIs are generally lower-cost and have longer shelf lives than the finished drug products they make. Filling the SAPIR will also insulate the United States from the concentration of foreign, sometimes adversary, nations in the world-wide supply of the Key Starting Materials used to make APIs. Moreover, Government purchases of APIs to fill the SAPIR can encourage more domestic production of APIs.
Unfortunately, the Biden Administration failed to advance the goal of ensuring domestic sources for essential medicines and their precursors despite spending billions of dollars on efforts to secure supply chains. Domestic production and procurement did not increase and the SAPIR is nearly empty.
Sec. 2. Filling the SAPIR with APIs for the Most Critical Medicines. (a) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the ASPR shall develop a list, in consultation with agencies with scientific expertise, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy (APEP), and the Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor (APHSA), of approximately 26 drugs that are especially critical to the health and security interests of the Nation (the critical drugs) and an accounting of existing, available funds that can be utilized, consistent with statutory authorities, to finance the preparation and opening of the SAPIR repository and to obtain and maintain the 6-month supply of APIs for the critical drugs referenced in subsection (c) of this section shall be provided to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The OMB shall provide assistance to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to facilitate the repurposing of available funds, consistent with law.
(b) Within 120 days of the date of this order and subject to the availability of funds identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the ASPR shall, in coordination with such other agencies as are necessary, take all measures to ready the existing SAPIR repository so that it can begin receiving and maintaining APIs.
(c) Subject to the availability of funds identified pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the ASPR shall obtain a 6-month supply of the APIs needed to make the critical drugs to fill the SAPIR, with a preference for obtaining domestically manufactured APIs if possible. The ASPR shall place such APIs within the SAPIR repository no later than 30 days after the repository is certified by the ASPR as ready to receive and maintain APIs.
Sec. 3. Ensuring SAPIR Resilience. (a) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the ASPR shall provide the APHSA, the APEP, and the OMB with an update to the ASPR’s 2022 list of 86 essential medicines and medical countermeasures, along with a plan to:
(i) obtain from domestic manufacturers, where possible;
(ii) store; and
(iii) maintain a 6-month supply of APIs for drugs on the updated essential medicines list if they have not already been addressed in the list of critical drugs identified pursuant to section 2(a) of this order.
(b) The plan provided pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall include a proposal and cost estimate for opening a second SAPIR repository in the United States within 1 year of the date of this order.
Sec. 4. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
(d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Health and Human Services.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 13, 2025.